Part 3: On United National Movement and Georgian Dream

Argument Against Georgian Dream

This is the 3rd note in the series on UNM and GD. In the first note I tried to make the case on why UNM’s contribution has been a significant positive in Georgia’s development over the last 9 years. In the second note, I tried to analyze the mistakes that UNM made during their rule and how these mistakes led to their loss in the most recent elections. This brings me to my next point:

I am strongly against GD because they are moving Georgia in the wrong direction. I was against them even before October 2012 elections but the events that have started to unfold after they came to power have confirmed my opinion practically beyond any doubt.

After the elections, Georgia had a unique chance to develop into a real democracy. For the first time in nearly a decade, no political power had a constitutional majority in the parliament. Moreover, two opposing political forces were nearly equally represented in the government with GD controlling the legislature and most of the executive, while UNM had some checks against the executive and controlled most of the local governments, and the judiciary. This arrangement implied a possibility of real checks and balances of one political force against the other, and had the potential to evolve into a stable democracy.

Unfortunately, GD had squandered this chance. Not that UNM is entirely blameless here, but GD had the ball in its court and they decided to pursue a different course. Instead of working within the system of checks and balances, they started an all-out assault against the opposition and tried (and are still trying) to push them out of government by all means possible. Their aim is clear, it has been stated pretty openly by GD leadership: to remove UNM from Georgia’s political arena. Now, I cannot blame a political force for trying to grab as much power as possible – this is natural. What I have a real issue with though, is that GD is conducting this power grab by undemocratic methods. They have all but abandoned the notion that power transfers in a democracy must happen by electoral means. It seems like they don’t want to wait for the local elections in 2014 to come to power on the municipal level. They don’t even want to wait until October of this year to grab more executive power. They are using coercive powers of the state to pressure and undermine the opposition – same dirty tactics for which they criticized UNM just a few months ago. If this is how they act while they don’t have absolute power, it is disheartening to think what they will evolve into if their power becomes absolute. In short, there is a real danger that the next elections in Georgia will be much less democratic than the previous ones – and this would be a real tragedy.

Not to be empty-worded, I have several reasons for making the claims I made above. In their recent assault on the opposition, GD has done quite a few things that don’t sit well with me. But 3 things really stand out as unacceptable: (1) politically-motivated arrests, (2) pressure of pro-opposition media, and (3) intimidation of opposition-controlled local governments. These 3 things are rather interrelated, but let’s consider them one by one:

1. Politically-motivated arrests

It is clear to me beyond any doubt that most (if not all) of high-profile arrests that GD has conducted since they came to power (and they conducted ~20 such arrests) were politically-motivated. This is not to say that the people they arrested were innocent – this is for the courts to decide (and at any rate, I don’t have the evidence to make a claim one way or the other). This is to say that the arrests were conducted with a political goal in mind, and absent this political goal the arrests either wouldn’t have happened or would have happened very differently.

What makes me so sure that the arrests were politically motivated? Well, in some cases the political goal was quite obvious. But even beyond that, there are 3 factors that we can look at to rule out almost any other possibility: (a) low standard of evidence, (b) use of pre-trial detention, (c) selective application of justice. Let’s examine them one by one as well:

a. Low standard of evidence

One would think that given the post-election sensitivities GD would do everything possible to ensure that their actions could not be misconstrued as a witch-hunt against UNM. This would imply building strong cases supported by material evidence before bringing charges against current or former officials belonging to UNM. In democracies, it is a standard practice that in cases against the opposition the standard of evidence is higher than in regular cases. Such cases take months or even years to build and they rely more than just on witness testimonies. This is done precisely to diminish the possibility of political prosecution of the opposition, and such practices are critical to democracies.

Unfortunately, GD decided to do things very differently. Most of the arrests happened within days after the cases were opened – before any real evidence could have been gathered. In most cases the arrests were driven only by witness testimonies, and in some cases the evidence that prompted the arrests was simply fabricated. I will list two examples:

Bacho Akhalaia – the former defense and interior minister – was arrested just a couple of days after the case against him was opened. The arrest was based solely on witness testimonies. Later, one of the main witnesses released a statement saying that he was coerced by the government into giving a false testimony against Akhalaia. After this, the witness was arrested as well.

Tengiz Gunava – the former head of the general inspection of the interior ministry – was arrested for carrying an unregistered weapon and drugs. An independent expertise later confirmed that the evidence was simply planted, and the interior minister promptly fired the 5 people responsible for Gunava’s arrest. However, shortly thereafter Gunava was arrested on a different charge.

Moreover, in most cases those arrested were not formally charged with anything for nearly 48 hours after the arrests. While this complies with the letter of the law, it does raise questions about whether people were arrested before the prosecution even had a case against them. It seems highly likely that while the people set in detention, the prosecution was working on flushing out the details of charges on which they were supposed to be arrested.

As I said above, this goes against everything that is commonly done in democracies. Instead of ensuring high standard of evidence for these highly sensitive cases, GD made it look as if they first decided who needs to be arrested, then hastily found the evidence to support the arrests (or fabricated the evidence if none could be found), and finally conducted the arrests before they could even develop formal charges. One example will perfectly illustrate this sequence:

Giorgi Kalandadze – Army Chief of Staff – was arrested on November 7th, just a few days after a case in which he was implicated was opened. The arrest came after GD’s Minister of Defense failed to replace Kalandadze with his loyal figure (under the current constitution it is the prerogative of the president to appoint Army Chief of Staff). The arrest was supported only by witness testimonies and one of the witnesses later reneged on his testimony (it was the same witness as in the case with Akhalaia). The charges against Kalandadze were not brought until November 9th and even when brought, they lacked detail – he was arrested for a single incident of “verbally and physically abusing” several soldiers in 2011 but what this actually meant was not specified. Given the weak case for Kalandadze’s pre-trial detention, the court released him on bail. Immediately after this, charges were filed against Kalandadze to suspend him from office while he is a subject of investigation. The judge satisfied these demands, and in the end Kalandadze was removed from his position as the Army Chief of Staff.

Needless to say, that in a democratic country it would be inconceivable to arrest such a high-ranking official on a case that was opened just a couple of days prior and was based purely on witness testimony. Even more outrageous would be holding such a high-ranking officer in detention without formally charging him with anything for 2 days. Such things just do not happen unless the motive of the arrest is not pursuit of justice but rather politics.

b. Use of pre-trial detention

If the practice of building strong cases before charging high-ranking ex-government officials is common in democracies, the practice of using pre-trial detention is extremely uncommon. Unless there is a serious flight risk, the prosecution rarely demands pre-trial detention, and even if demanded the pre-trial detention is rarely supported by the court. For example, former Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi did not spend a single day in detention or under arrest while his trial was ongoing. Perhaps an even better example is the case of the former Illinois governor, Rod Blagojevich, which perfectly illustrates how such high-profile cases should be handled.

Rod Blagojevich was arrested by FBI on corruption charges in December of 2008. By that time the investigation which resulted in his arrest had been going on for 3 years. A month before the arrest, FBI was granted a permission to wire-tap and record Blagojevich’s conversations, and his arrest was in part based on these recordings. Blagojevich was arrested on the morning of December 9th. In the afternoon of the same day he was brought before the judge who released him on bail of $4,500 (but his passport was revoked to ensure that he doesn’t leave the country). In the end, Blagojevich didn’t spend a single day in detention, and remained the governor of Illinois until January 29th of 2009 when he was impeached from his post.

This example contrasts starkly with what has been going on in Georgia in recent months. The fact that most high-profile arrests happened only days after the investigations were opened and lacked material evidence I have already covered. After the arrested spent about 2 days behind bars (waiting to be formally charged) the prosecution invariably demanded to put them into a pre-trial detention, at times without any justification. While some were eventually released on bail (though the bail amounts were quite high for Georgia), many ended up in pre-trial detention.

It is difficult to explain by pursuit of justice alone the need to hold all these people on remand. Many of them constituted no flight risk and could not have interfered with the investigations any more than an ordinary person could. Why did the prosecution do it then? A simple display of force aimed at scaring political opponents seems like a likely answer. Thus again, in situations where one would have hoped that GD would exercise extra caution, they chose to act in ways unacceptable for democracies – all to strengthen their political position.

c. Selective application of justice

The last major point on why I am convinced GD has been engaged in politically-motivated arrests is selective application of justice. The term is quite well defined, but to be clear, by selective justice I mean cases when the law is applied differently to the opponents of the government as compared to everyone else. In the last two months, GD had demonstrated numerous such cases, but I will list 3 that I know the best:

Kakha Getsadze – the head of Zestaphoni municipality – was arrested on November 29th for a brawl at a party that took place over a year and a half ago. It seems strange that the current government dug up such an old case on a relatively minor charge only in pursuit of justice. There are probably dozens (if not more) of instances of bar fights etc. that happened much more recently and could also warrant investigation – but it seems like Getsadze’s case was brought up exactly because he was a head of Zestaphoni municipality and belonged to the opposition.

Bacho Akhalaia – the former defense and interior minister – was widely portrayed by the GD as one of the most sinister figures in UNM’s government. Akhalaia left Georgia shortly after October 2012 elections, but returned back to the country on November 5th, knowing that he would face an imminent arrest. He was arrested on November 7th, denied bail on November 9th, and has been held in pre-trial detention since then. The prosecution was adamant about keeping Akhalaia on remand, and when his trial was rescheduled from late December to late January, the Minister of Justice even said publicly that she doesn’t see anything to be concerned about if Akhalaia spends New Year in jail. I’ve already explained above why such speedy arrest and insistence on pre-trial detention are highly unusual for democracies. What I want to do here though, is to contrast Akhalaia’s case with the case of another former minister – Irakli Okruashvili (who is sympathetic to GD). Okruashvili fled Georgia in late 2007, and he was later sentenced by the UNM government to several years in prison on a number of charges. Since then he resided in France on a political asylum. Just like Akhalaia, Okruashvili recently returned to Georgia knowing that he will be facing an imminent arrest, and he was promptly arrested when his plane landed in Tbilisi. However, the prosecution has been actively pushing for Okruashvili’s release on bail. The same minister of justice that was so insistent on Akhalaia’s pre-trial detention recently said that the fact that Okruashivili returned to Georgia voluntarily knowing that he’ll be arrested was sufficient to release him on bail. She seems to have forgotten that Akhalaia also returned to Georgia voluntarily. It looks like for GD the fact that Akhalaia is from UNM while Okruashvili opposes UNM is sufficient enough to treat them differently before the law.

Tengiz Gunava – as I mentioned above Gunava was arrested on fabricated evidence, and later the people responsible for his arrest were fired by the current Interior Minister. The selective application of justice here was not so much to Gunava (in this, there was no justice at all) but to the 5 people who were fired for planting evidence. At the first glance it might be difficult to see signs of selective justice here – after all, those who planted the evidence were promptly fired. It might even appear that the current government acted prudently. However, the selective application of justice becomes apparent once we compare this to some other ongoing cases that the current government is pursuing. Specifically, on November 15th, 2012 twelve members of the former government were arrested on charges of illegal surveillance and confinement. Among them were Shota Khizanishvili – a former deputy of interior minister and Levan Kardava – a former head of Department of Constitutional Security. In my mind, planting of evidence and illegal surveillance and confinement are comparable charges (planting evidence might actually be much worse). Yet, those who broke the law under current government were simply fired, while those who allegedly broke the law under the previous government were arrested and most of them were denied bail. Clearly, the current government is much more lenient toward its own members than toward their political opponents. Such selective application of the law is simply unacceptable in a democracy.

To sum up: it is clear that under the name of “restoration of justice” the new government has engaged in prosecution of the opposition. Vast majority of the high-profile arrests they conducted over the last 2 months were politically motivated. This can be seen from the fact that instead of following practices commonly accepted in democracies, the new government has: (1) employed a very low standard of evidence in bringing charges against political opponents, (2) has excessively used pre-trial detention as the means of intimidating the opposition, and (3) has applied justice selectively based on political sentiment. If such practices continue, this will clearly be very detrimental for Georgia.

2. Pressure of pro-opposition media

After two months in power, it has become clear that the new government has decided to continue the poor treatment of opposition media so characteristic of the previous one. In fact GD is taking this practice to the next level.

It wouldn’t be an overstatement to say that in Georgia there is no independent media. There are pro-government and pro-opposition channels. This has been the case under the UNM rule and this is the case now. Starting in late 2007, the previous government did much to ensure that they control main television channels – though they have relaxed this practice somewhat in the last year. This is not to say that there was no opposition media in Georgia. Opposition channels existed and were quite popular but their reach frequently was restricted to Tbilisi (which contains over 1/3 of Georgia’s population). Also, the pro-UNM channels frequently received favorable tax treatment.

Now, the tables seem to have turned: pro-UNM channels are being pressured as GD is fighting to gain absolute control over media. There are a couple of examples I can cite:

One of the first things the new government did after they came to power was to launch a tax probe into Georgia’s Public Broadcaster (GPB). Despite being criticized severely for this action by high-ranking western officials, GD persisted with its pressure against GPB leadership. Under Georgian law, it is very difficult to fire the head of GPB – he is elected for a term of 6 years to minimize possibility of being pressured by political interests. But if the head of GPB resigns voluntarily a new head must be elected. This is exactly what happened with the previous head of GPB, Giorgi Chanturia, who resigned on December 14th, 2012. It is important to say that no charges were ever bought against Chanturia, but it is hardly a secret to anyone that he was forced out under GD’s pressure. It must be said, that GPB was perhaps the most neutral TV channel in Georgia – though it undoubtedly had a pro-UNM bend. This bend was likely to persist even after GD came to power, and it is clear that GD was unwilling to tolerate this. In fact, GD’s leader and the new Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, publicly stated that he would like his own TV channel (Channel 9) to be become the new public broadcaster of Georgia.

The second example is the arrest of the head of Rustavi 2 (a pro-UNM channel), Nika Gvaramia on December 19th, 2012 on charges not related to his current position. Now, I will not argue whether Gvaramia is innocent or guilty of the charges brought against him – this is for the court to decide. But for the reasons I described previously, the arrest was clearly politically motivated. Gvaramia was only tangentially implicated in the case under which he was arrested, he was held in detention for 2 days before being formally charged, prosecution demanded his pre-trial detention citing his high “intellectual capabilities” though the court didn’t find this sufficient and released him on bail. Given the sensitivities surrounding bringing charges against the head of an opposition TV channel, one would think that the new government would have exercised as much caution as possible, and would have tried to do everything to ensure that their actions could not be interpreted as politically motivated. They didn’t have to keep Gvaramia in detention for 2 days and didn’t have to demand his pre-trial detention on bogus pretexts. If they had done that, it would have been very difficult to think of this incident as political pressure of the opposition. But, they decided to act differently. This makes me believe that Gvaramia’s arrest had more to do with his current position as the head of Rustavi 2 rather than with the charges brought against him.

Overall, in just 2 months GD has gained control over almost all TV channels in Georgia. After they came to power most pro-UNM channels quickly changed their leadership. Those that didn’t do so voluntarily (e.g. GPB) were pressured into removing their leadership. By mid-December 2012, Rustavi 2 remained as perhaps the only pro-UNM TV channel in Georgia, and even its leadership was a target of politically-motivated arrests. If Rustavi 2 goes the way of Imedi and GPB, the monopolization of media by GD will be complete. This did not happen under UNM rule in recent years. Though they pressured the pro-opposition media consistently, there always was a channel or two that broadcasted pro-opposition points of view. But it seems like GD is prepared to go much further than UNM ever did in this area.

3. Intimidation of opposition-controlled local governments

Perhaps the worst abuse of democratic principles by GD can be seen in their fight for control over municipal governments. The issue is simple: GD won the parliamentary elections with a 55% majority – this gives them the right to form the national government, but local governments are still under UNM control. Local elections are scheduled for 2014 – so, unless something is done, GD would not be able to have absolute control over government for nearly 2 more years (and who knows what the election results will be 2 years from now). It is clear, that GD is not willing to live under such constraints. They are trying to use whatever means possible to gain control over municipal governments now – not in 2014. In this they have shown how little they care about one of the central principles of democracy – the principle that power must be transferred by electoral means. If they are unwilling to adhere to this principle on the municipal level and if they are successful in this, who’s to say that they won’t try to do the same with national elections?

Before I describe how GD has been applying pressure to the municipal governments, let’s look at its results. Within just two months after coming to power, GD was able to take control over 31 out of 69 of Georgian municipalities. Since local elections are not due for another 2 years, most of the transfer of power has happened after the heads of local governments resigned “voluntarily.” No matter what you believe about GD and UNM, but such exodus of local government officials on voluntary basis in such a short period of time is simply impossible. So, let’s look at what enacted this dramatic change.

The scenario varies from municipality to municipality but the general picture is as follows: first, pro-UNM heads of local governments are approached by GD and are asked politely to switch sides. Those who refused are frequently threatened with financial, and at times, criminal, investigations. At times investigations are even launched against close relatives of the heads of local self-governments. Giga Akhvlediani, the new deputy head of the Financial Police is frequently cited as the one who oversees the process of blackmailing heads of local administrations. If people still don’t budge, GD activists assemble rallies in front local self-governments and try to stop them from performing their daily duties. At times these rallies turn violent – the protesters storm municipal buildings, damage government property, and refuse to leave until pro-UNM administration resigns. Police is usually quite slow to react in these cases, and when they do, no charges are brought against those who broke the law. This all happens against the backdrop of public silence and private encouragement from GD leadership.

Again, not to be empty-worded I’ll list a couple concrete examples:

Kakha Getsadze – I’ve already talked about his case before. A pro-UNM head of Zestaphoni municipality, Getsadze was arrested for a brawl at a party that happened a year and a half ago. The arrest was clearly politically-motivated with the goal being Getsadze’s removal from his current post.

Martvili municipality – on November 26th, 2012 a protest rally headed by the local leader of GD was held in front of the municipal building. After a short while the protesters stormed the building, broke furniture and windows, and refused to leave until the head of the administration resigns. They remained in the building until November 29th, when they finally were evicted by the police. But no charges were pressed against those who damaged government property and the protesters continued their pickets until December 31st – practically paralyzing the functioning of the local government. This incident has been widely criticized by such NGO’s as GYLA, ISFED, and Article 42. However, GD leadership has been suspiciously silent on the matter. One can reasonably assume that these unlawful actions were held under tacit approval of GD leadership and perhaps even with their encouragement.

The two examples that I listed are by no means isolated. Pro-UNM leaders of local self-governments of Khobi  and Vani have also been arrested. Violent protests have been held in the municipalities of Tetritskaro and Tsalka, and other forms of open pressure have been applied against pro-UNM administrations of Samtredia, Marneuli, and Poti. It is not difficult to imagine that after such examples many of local pro-UNM leaders feel threatened and resign “voluntarily.” If this is the type of “democracy” GD is planning to uphold in the future, it will go beyond most “authoritarian” tendencies of UNM.

To summarize: in the short two months after coming to power, GD (1) has engaged in politically-motivated arrests and intimidation of the high-ranking members of the opposition, (2) nearly monopolized Georgia’s media and pressured the only remaining pro-UNM television channel, and (3) has used coercive powers of the state to usurp power in local self-governments.

As I mentioned above, these are only the 3 major manifestations of the pressure GD is exerting against the opposition.  There are many more. These range from cutting funding for almost any branch of government not currently under GD’s control to thinly veiled threats made by top-ranking GD officials against UNM (for example, the new prime minister publicly stated that unless UNM becomes more cooperative the prosecution of the party will continue). Moreover, they have shown almost complete disregard to the opinions of the western leaders that have tried to point out their mistakes. Thus, it is clear to me beyond any doubt that if such behavior continues this will deal severe, perhaps irreparable, blow to the development of Georgia.