Monday, January 21, 2013

Part 4: On United National Movement and Georgian Dream


Electoral Platform of Georgian Dream and Reality

This is the 4th note in the series on UNM and GD. The first two notes were dedicated to the analysis of UNM's rule - the first one of their achievements and the second one of their mistakes. In the 3rd note, I've tried to present an argument against GD centering around their use of un-democratic practices in trying to monopolize power. In this note, I will try to examine the reasons for GD to act the way they do.

One might wonder: why does GD try to engage in such practices? Why do they want to grab all the power now and try to do so by disregarding democratic processes? There are could be many answers but the one that makes the most sense to me is that they understand how fleeting their success might be.

To win the elections GD aggressively campaigned as being a complete opposite of UNM on most issues. Didn’t really matter whether that was building a bridge in the center of Tbilisi, moving the parliament to Kutaisi, introducing RFID chips into IDs, introducing hybrid corn into Georgian agriculture or almost anything else. If UNM was for it, GD was against it, and not just against – but against to the point of irrationality. UNM was evil, and anything they did was evil by default. Now, after two months have passed, it seems like GD has discovered that they have to do exactly the same things they accused UNM of just a few months ago. Mover, it has become clear that many of the accusations they laid against UNM are not holding true. Add to that the fact that they severely over-promised during their electoral campaign and had to renege on many of their promises after coming to power, and we will see that their popularity is in danger. Quite soon the people will see that GD didn’t materially change anything, and probably made a few things much worse. I don’t know if this will happen 3, 6, or 12 months from now, but I wouldn’t be surprised if GD’s popularity were to fall below 50% in less than a year.

Perhaps the thing that can decrease GD’s popularity the most is the realization that many accusations GD made against UNM were severely exaggerated or even invalid. To me, this has been clear even before the elections and this is why I never supported GD. However, many in Georgia had a different point of view, and in their mind, once UNM lost power, all of their wrongdoings would be exposed, justices would be restored, and this would lead to dramatic changes in the lives of ordinary people. Let’s go through some of these accusations and see what has been actually happening.

1. Elite Corruption

Perhaps the thing that UNM was the most frequently accused of was so-called “elite corruption.” I frequently heard GD supporters say that while UNM was able to eliminate regular corruption, they made elite corruption more pervasive. By elite corruption people meant that while regular government officials stopped taking bribes, high-ranking government officials kept enriching themselves through illegal means. How did this elite corruption manifest itself? Well, I’ve heard quite a few things but I’ll try to summarize the most common ones:

Business seizures – it was widely believe by GD supporters that high-ranking government officials frequently engaged in seizure of business for their benefit. The belief was that successful businessmen were approached by the government officials and forced to transfer ownership of their businesses (either partially or completely) to high-ranking UNM officials or their relatives/friends. This belief was so engrained in many Georgians that they believed that most businesses in Georgia were either directly or indirectly owned by top ranking UNM members.

Well, after two months in power GD failed to charge a single high-ranking UNM government official with a seizure of anyone’s business. In fact, I am not aware of any government officials from the previous government being charged with a seizure of anyone’s business. Some might say that two months are not enough – that the government is collecting and examining evidence, building up cases etc. But this seems highly unlikely to me given how they didn’t have an issue with arresting an ex-minister of defense for “verbally and physically” abusing soldiers solely on witness testimony a couple of days after his case was opened.

Government racketeering of businesses – another widespread belief was that UNM government made most (if not all) businesses pay a portion of their profits either directly or indirectly to high-ranking UNM members. I was even quoted some numbers in the range of 20% or 25% that UNM charged the business to allow them to operate. The result of this belief was an expectation that when UNM loses power prices for most goods and services will come down.

Well, UNM has lost power over two months ago – so, the racketeering must have stopped. But the prices didn’t go down any more than their annual trend would imply. In fact, for some categories of products the prices have even increases. So, if there was any racketeering GD must have adapted the practice. Though, I am more inclined to believe that there was no racketeering in the first place

Extortion of money from the population through monopolies – this was another widespread belief that went as follows: most of the companies in Georgia are controlled by high-ranking UNM members or people connected with them. So, to maximize their profits they have entered into monopolistic agreements with each other and are charging regular people extremely high prices. This was believed to be the case for utilities, gasoline, pharmaceuticals, agricultural and most other products. So, GD had campaigned aggressively on the promise of reducing prices. The expectation within the population was that if GD came to power prices for gasoline, electricity, natural gas would fall by as much as 50%.

Well, things turned out not to be as simple once GD came to power. On November 28th, Ivanishvili publicly acknowledged that his party exaggerated the potential reduction of prices on natural gas and electricity, but said that he believed that 10% reduction in prices was possible. On December 26th, he again acknowledged that he was optimistic and natural gas tariff was fair and would not be reduced at all. Electricity tariff was in fact reduced on December 24th by as much as 25% for certain categories of consumers but this reduction is at the moment temporary (it was enacted for 3 months) and is pending a permanent agreement with electricity companies that want to be compensated through other means for the lost revenue. Adding to this the fact that prices in most other categories of products didn’t fall dramatically (and as I mentioned increases in some categories), it has become clear that whatever “monopolization” UNM was doing didn’t affect price levels in the country, and there was no “extortion of money through monopolization” of any sort.

Oppressing businesses – this was perhaps the most widespread belief and it was the one which GD was most vocal about. The essence of the belief was that UNM government oppressed businessmen who were not under their control by imposing unfair fines and eventually driving them out of business.  Supposedly, UNM did this to drive the competition out of the market and increase profits for businesses owned by high-ranking UNM members. The belief was that most, if not all, business were at some point oppressed by UNM.

Undoubtedly UNM’s record when it comes to property rights has been far from stellar. They indeed disregarded them on quite a few occasions, and it is highly likely that some government officials used their power to advance their personal goals. But was this practice endemic? Until recently it would have been difficult to tell. But now, since UNM is out of power we can try to directionally estimate the magnitude of the problem.

Since the new government came to power about two months ago, there has been consistently a line forming outside the prosecutor’s office to submit complaints against UNM government. At times this line was hundreds of people long. According to the information released recently, roughly 7,000 complaints have been submitted to date. The government has not yet released statistics on the nature of these complaints, but it is not difficult to guess that most of them are business-related. Basically, those who feel that they were mistreated by the previous (UNM) government – e.g. the government imposed unfair fines on their businesses, or forced them out of business for one reason or another – want to restore justice. Now, let’s assume that 80% of the complaints are business-related and that all of them are valid (a big assumption, if you ask me). Also, let’s assume that not everyone who was mistreated is going to submit a complaint – let’s say that for everyone who has submitted a complaint there are 4 people who were mistreated but either did not get around to submitting a complaint yet, or feel like it’s not worth the effort. So, we get about 28,000 “oppressed” businessmen total. Now, let’s say that most of the violations happened in the last 4 years (and those that happened in the earlier years of UNM rule have been forgotten) – this means, on average, UNM government was “oppressing” 7K business per year.

Undoubtedly, this number looks huge. But let’s compare it to the total number of business in Georgia. According to the business registry, as of January 1, 2012, there were about 400K businesses registered in Georgia. To be conservative, let’s assume that half of those are inactive – this gives us 200K active businesses. What this means, is that even under very conservative (or generous – depending how you look at it) estimates 3% of business where “oppressed” by the government each year. Now, if I were to make my assumptions a bit more realistic – let’s say only half of the complaints are valid, and that the majority of those who have not yet submitted a complaint feel like the “oppression” was rather minimal, we’ll get a number that is well under 1%.

In short, in the worst case the UNM government had “oppressed” about 3% of the businessmen per year, and in a more realistic case this number was under 1%. Now, this might be a huge number – I don’t have a benchmark to compare it against other countries, but it is nowhere close to what many in Georgia believed – that the government had oppressed nearly all or a majority of businesses. One must agree that there is a big difference between “a majority” and less than 1%. So, once again, GD’s accusation is turning out to be greatly exaggerated.

Widespread misuse of government funds – another belief that many of those in the opposition to UNM shared was that UNM officials greatly benefited from various projects that the government undertook. Many believed that building roads, parks, fountains etc. was just a pretext for the government to steal money from the people, and that a large portion of the government budget was used to benefit high-ranking UNM members. This belief led to an assumption that once UNM lost power and the widespread misuse of funds was eliminated, the new government would be able to spend the money more efficiently. One result of such belief was that in case UNM lost power, pensions can be increased dramatically or higher education could be made almost entirely free. The logic went like this: if UNM is stealing money, once they are gone there will be more money to be spent on social needs.

Well, again – UNM lost power and GD had an opportunity to put together their own budget. The budget they put together was quite similar to UNM’s budget. Moreover, it didn’t envision any dramatic increases in pensions (in fact, pension increases implied by GD’s budget are lower than what UNM promised for 2013) and no other social programs benefited materially. The conclusions are easy to draw: either UNM was not misusing government funds, or GD is doing the same thing. And again, I tend to believe that it is the former.

I don’t want to be misunderstood. Undoubtedly, there were problems under UNM. It is very probable that some business were “expropriated” (though, I would like the new government to prove this in court), that some monopolies were looked at leniently, that a large number of entrepreneurs were fined unjustly, and that some government officials misused public funds for personal enrichment. However, these issues were not any worse in Georgia than in many Eastern and Southern European countries, and they were greatly exaggerated by GD during their electoral campaign. This exaggeration led to unreasonable expectations for a large part of Georgian population. For if UNM was as bad as GD made it look, once UNM was gone prices must fall by 25% (no more racketeering of business or government sponsored monopolies), pensions would triple (no more widespread misuse of public funds), economic growth would explode (no more oppressions or expropriation of business). The reality is such though that none of this is happening or will happen. Prices are likely to remain roughly the same, pensions will rise by as much as UNM forecasted, economic growth is likely to slow somewhat. Undoubtedly, many of GD voters will be displeased by this.


2. Police State

Another accusation frequently brought against UNM was that they had created a police state. That arrests were arbitrary, that due process was violated, that innocent people ended up in jail, that violation of human rights was endemic, and that the justice systems was a servant of party interests.

While again, there definitely were issues in this area under UNM rule (especially as it relates to an absence of independent judiciary), the problems were greatly exaggerated by GD. I’ve heard a variety of claims to support the accusations above. Just as I did above, I will try to summarize the most common ones:

Arbitrary arrests of innocent people – it was widely believed by GD supporters that UNM put a large number of innocent people behind bars either on false pretexts or in violation of due process. The new government had over 2 months to address this issue. So far they’ve taken two actions in this area: declaring about 190 inmates to be political prisoners and issuing a wide-scale amnesty which will result in nearly immediate release of about 3,000 prisoners. Let’s consider these actions separately.

Political prisoners – on December 5th, just a month after taking power, the GD-dominated parliament recognized 190 inmates as political prisoners. The process by which these 190 people were selected was highly rushed and flawed. In fact, reputable Georgian NGO’s such as GYLA and Article 42 (organizations which cannot be suspected of having any pro-UNM sympathies) withdrew from the process stating that the deadlines set by the parliament were unrealistic and didn’t allow for proper review of the cases. In fact, these two NGO’s counted only about 60 prisoners that were put in jail in violation of the due process. Time constraint was not the only flaw of the process – there were many more flaws and some of them put in question the objectivity of the entire process. I’ll leave it to the reader to hypothesize why the new government decided not to take an extra month or two and acted rashly in deciding such an important and sensitive question. What I want to point out is that we can estimate the number of people put in jail in violation of the due process and this number is definitely below 200, and probably around 60.

Now, let’s compare it with Georgia’s inmate population. In October 2012 there were about 22K prisoners in Georgia. This would imply the number of those who were wrongfully imprisoned is between 0.3% and 1% of inmates. On the reverse, these means that over 99% of prisoners in Georgian prisons were not “arbitrarily arrested innocent people.” So, the accusation that UNM government put a large number of innocent people behind bars simply does not hold true.

Amnesty – as I mentioned above, the second action that the new government undertook in the area of prisoners was to pass a wide-scale amnesty (this law was passed by overruling the president’s veto). I want to make it clear that this amnesty is not viewed as a release of innocent people – it is widely accepted that those released by the amnesty are guilty of the crimes they were imprisoned for. In fact, it is expected both by the population and the new government that the crime rates will go up after the amnesty takes effect. So, again: the amnesty does not release innocent people – but gives another chance to those who have committed crimes. While rationality of this action can be debated, let’s look at the results it is aimed to achieve.

The amnesty will immediately release up to 3,000 inmates or about 15% of Georgia’s prison population. Another 6,000 inmates will potentially end up with their prison terms reduced significantly. One of the goals of this action was to reduce the load on Georgia’s penitentiary system. During the electoral campaign GD frequently criticized UNM for increasing Georgia’s incarceration rate to be one of the highest in the world and 2nd highest in Europe (behind Russia). If we look at the facts though, Georgia’s prison population has been declining steadily throughout 2012. In fact, in November 2012 there were almost 3,000 fewer imprisoned people in Georgia as there were in January 2012. So, UNM released almost the same number of people from prisons in 2012 as is envisioned by GD’s amnesty – though they did it quietly.

Moreover, even after the amnesty takes effect, Georgia will still have one of the highest incarceration rates and will be 3rd in Europe (behind Russia and Belarus) on this metric. The point I am trying to make is that this widely publicized amnesty does not change anything materially. Georgia was already on the downward trend in reducing incarceration rates under UNM – the amnesty will speed up this trend but won’t change things dramatically.

To summarize: the accusations that UNM arbitrarily arrested and unjustly imprisoned a large number of people have been greatly exaggerated. Over 99% of the prison population was arrested for real crimes in accordance with the law. Moreover, UNM had started the trend of reducing Georgia’s prison population which swelled as a result of zero-tolerance against crime policy. In 2012 they reduced the prison population by about 3,000 people – a number similar to what GD’s amnesty is aimed to accomplish.

Dysfunctional plea-bargaining system – it was widely believed that the plea-barraging system in Georgia was used by UNM government to extract money from the population. While I agree that there were serious flaws in this system, the extent of the issue has again been greatly exaggerated by GD. Let’s look at the numbers:

In Georgia, about 50% of the cases are settled through the plea barraging system. This means that over the last 4 years about 40K cases went through this system. How many of these were conducted improperly? Well, it is very difficult to tell until the new government conducts proper analysis in this area, but again, we can use some directional estimates based on the number of complaints submitted against the UNM government in recent months. To remind, according to the recently released information about 7,000 people submitted complaints against UNM government. Let’s assume that about 25% were from those who went through the plea bargaining system (this is a very rough assumption, but the logic is as follows: 50% of those who complained went through the judicial system – the rest decided to pay fines etc. without ever engaging the court; of these 50% went through the court process and the remainder utilized pleas bargaining system). To round up, this gives us about 2,000 people. Now, let’s assume that not everyone who was wronged by the plea bargaining system was has submitted or will submit a claim. Let’s say that for every one who submits a claim there is 1 more person who would not. Also, let’s assume that all claims are valid. This gives us about 4K people who were wronged by the plea-bargaining system.

What this implies that that about 10% of the cases that went through the plea bargaining system were handled with violations. Now, again, this is a very rough estimate – the number could be 20% or it could be 5% - it is very difficult to tell. But I am fairly confident that it is somewhere in this range. Undoubtedly, 10% is a significant number and this exposes real flaws in the plea bargaining system in Georgia. But again, on the reverse of this is that about 90% of plea bargains were conducted properly. So, once again, the notion that UNM government utilized plea bargaining system to convert Georgia into a police state was greatly exaggerated.

Violation of human rights – this was another common accusation against UNM government. I will spend very little time on this simply because, as far as I can tell, UNM government didn’t violate human rights any more than an average Eastern European country. This can be seen simply by looking at the number of cases submitted from Georgia to the European Court of Human Rights each year. This number is about the European average.

Again, I don’t want to be misunderstood: there are some real problems in regards to justice in Georgia. The courts are hardly independent, the plea bargaining system needs to be reformed, and same goes for the penitentiary system. But it is simply not true that under UNM Georgia was a police state where a large number of innocent people were arbitrarily arrested, human rights violations were abnormally high, or that plea bargaining system was wrongfully applied in the vast majority of cases. As we can see, the new government failed to identify any significant number of wrongfully imprisoned people (even through the rushed and somewhat arbitrary process). They are not doing anything dramatically different from what UNM was doing in terms of reducing the number of prisoners in Georgia. The investigations into high-profile cases of when UNM government allegedly violated human rights so far have yielded little results, and my guess is that little will come of them.

To summarize this entire section: the accusations that GD laid against UNM during the electoral campaign are turning out to be greatly exaggerated. The new government struggles to identify and prove many of the wrongdoings they accused UNM of. No cases of “elite corruption” have been brought to court yet, no significant number “arbitrarily arrested innocent people” has been identified. Instead, GD has been charging ex-UNM officials with “physically and verbally abusing soldiers,” illegal surveillance, and bar fights that happened a year and a half ago. The rumors still circulate in Georgian society about how UNM stole billions, oppressed majority (or even all) businesses, imprisoned thousands of innocent people etc. But the longer these rumors remain without proof, the fewer people will believe them.

Moreover, many of GD’s predictions and promises have been turning out to be wrong. The prices on most categories of products did not fall, pensions could not be increased beyond what UNM promised, court acquittal rates remain about the same as they were under UNM. In fact, in many areas GD will not be able to do anything differently when compared to UNM. They will not be able to relax the financial burden on business significantly otherwise they risk missing budget obligations. This means that fining of businessmen will continue. They will not be able to step too far away from the “zero-tolerance against crime” policy because it will mean dramatic increase in crime rates. So, the prison population will remain fairly high over the next few years. Even in minor things they have to mimic UNM. For example, I frequently heard from UNM’s opposition that their ministers were too young (frequently around 30 or even below) and that this was unacceptable. Well, GD’s minister of interior is 30 years old.

Given how high people’s expectations were that GD will enact a dramatic transformation, it is not difficult to conclude that once the reality hits, GD stands to lose a large portion of its popular support. As I mentioned before, I don’t know whether this will happen 3, 6, or 12 months from now, but it wouldn’t be a surprise to me if GD’s popularity fell below 50% in the next year. So, the surest way for GD to keep power in the long term is to try to undermine and destroy UNM in the near future. If they fail to do that, they will face a steep competition in the presidential elections in October of this year, and even steep competition in the local elections of 2014. So, it is not surprising (even if disheartening) that GD has engaged in undemocratic tactics to monopolize power as soon as possible. And this is the real tragedy.

To make myself clear: I am not advocating that GD should be removed from power, that the parliament should be disbanded or anything of this sort. GD was elected by the people and they should remain in power until they lose election. Even though I think their rule will be detrimental for Georgia (for many reasons that go beyond what I’ve written above), I would like to see them run the country until the next democratic elections and beyond if they manage to garner enough political support. The main thing though, is to ensure that these elections are democratic. And the only thing, in my mind, that will ensure democratic elections is a presence of a strong opponent. Thus, I see persistence of UNM in Georgia’s politics as a guarantee (even if a weak one) against GD’s monopolization of power and in the end, continuation of the democratic development of Georgia.

The point is simple, those who turn a blind eye to the undemocratic things GD is doing now are doing a great disservice to the country. Those who say that it is OK for GD to do this because “UNM did it too” must understand that in the end, this will throw Georgia backward not forward. Even those who dislike or even hate UNM should understand that UNM represents a large portion of Georgia – currently between 20% and 40%. And in a democracy opinion of a minority – especially such a large minority – should be respected. For if GD is allowed to monopolize power, many of the developments of the last 9 years will be negated and many of the mistakes of this period will have to be repeated in the future. And I am not quite sure it will work out at all next time.

Part 3: On United National Movement and Georgian Dream


Argument Against Georgian Dream

This is the 3rd note in the series on UNM and GD. In the first note I tried to make the case on why UNM’s contribution has been a significant positive in Georgia’s development over the last 9 years. In the second note, I tried to analyze the mistakes that UNM made during their rule and how these mistakes led to their loss in the most recent elections. This brings me to my next point:

I am strongly against GD because they are moving Georgia in the wrong direction. I was against them even before October 2012 elections but the events that have started to unfold after they came to power have confirmed my opinion practically beyond any doubt.

After the elections, Georgia had a unique chance to develop into a real democracy. For the first time in nearly a decade, no political power had a constitutional majority in the parliament. Moreover, two opposing political forces were nearly equally represented in the government with GD controlling the legislature and most of the executive, while UNM had some checks against the executive and controlled most of the local governments, and the judiciary. This arrangement implied a possibility of real checks and balances of one political force against the other, and had the potential to evolve into a stable democracy.

Unfortunately, GD had squandered this chance. Not that UNM is entirely blameless here, but GD had the ball in its court and they decided to pursue a different course. Instead of working within the system of checks and balances, they started an all-out assault against the opposition and tried (and are still trying) to push them out of government by all means possible. Their aim is clear, it has been stated pretty openly by GD leadership: to remove UNM from Georgia’s political arena. Now, I cannot blame a political force for trying to grab as much power as possible – this is natural. What I have a real issue with though, is that GD is conducting this power grab by undemocratic methods. They have all but abandoned the notion that power transfers in a democracy must happen by electoral means. It seems like they don’t want to wait for the local elections in 2014 to come to power on the municipal level. They don’t even want to wait until October of this year to grab more executive power. They are using coercive powers of the state to pressure and undermine the opposition – same dirty tactics for which they criticized UNM just a few months ago. If this is how they act while they don’t have absolute power, it is disheartening to think what they will evolve into if their power becomes absolute. In short, there is a real danger that the next elections in Georgia will be much less democratic than the previous ones – and this would be a real tragedy.

Not to be empty-worded, I have several reasons for making the claims I made above. In their recent assault on the opposition, GD has done quite a few things that don’t sit well with me. But 3 things really stand out as unacceptable: (1) politically-motivated arrests, (2) pressure of pro-opposition media, and (3) intimidation of opposition-controlled local governments. These 3 things are rather interrelated, but let’s consider them one by one:

1. Politically-motivated arrests

It is clear to me beyond any doubt that most (if not all) of high-profile arrests that GD has conducted since they came to power (and they conducted ~20 such arrests) were politically-motivated. This is not to say that the people they arrested were innocent – this is for the courts to decide (and at any rate, I don’t have the evidence to make a claim one way or the other). This is to say that the arrests were conducted with a political goal in mind, and absent this political goal the arrests either wouldn’t have happened or would have happened very differently.

What makes me so sure that the arrests were politically motivated? Well, in some cases the political goal was quite obvious. But even beyond that, there are 3 factors that we can look at to rule out almost any other possibility: (a) low standard of evidence, (b) use of pre-trial detention, (c) selective application of justice. Let’s examine them one by one as well:

a. Low standard of evidence

One would think that given the post-election sensitivities GD would do everything possible to ensure that their actions could not be misconstrued as a witch-hunt against UNM. This would imply building strong cases supported by material evidence before bringing charges against current or former officials belonging to UNM. In democracies, it is a standard practice that in cases against the opposition the standard of evidence is higher than in regular cases. Such cases take months or even years to build and they rely more than just on witness testimonies. This is done precisely to diminish the possibility of political prosecution of the opposition, and such practices are critical to democracies.

Unfortunately, GD decided to do things very differently. Most of the arrests happened within days after the cases were opened – before any real evidence could have been gathered. In most cases the arrests were driven only by witness testimonies, and in some cases the evidence that prompted the arrests was simply fabricated. I will list two examples:

Bacho Akhalaia – the former defense and interior minister – was arrested just a couple of days after the case against him was opened. The arrest was based solely on witness testimonies. Later, one of the main witnesses released a statement saying that he was coerced by the government into giving a false testimony against Akhalaia. After this, the witness was arrested as well.

Tengiz Gunava – the former head of the general inspection of the interior ministry – was arrested for carrying an unregistered weapon and drugs. An independent expertise later confirmed that the evidence was simply planted, and the interior minister promptly fired the 5 people responsible for Gunava’s arrest. However, shortly thereafter Gunava was arrested on a different charge.

Moreover, in most cases those arrested were not formally charged with anything for nearly 48 hours after the arrests. While this complies with the letter of the law, it does raise questions about whether people were arrested before the prosecution even had a case against them. It seems highly likely that while the people set in detention, the prosecution was working on flushing out the details of charges on which they were supposed to be arrested.

As I said above, this goes against everything that is commonly done in democracies. Instead of ensuring high standard of evidence for these highly sensitive cases, GD made it look as if they first decided who needs to be arrested, then hastily found the evidence to support the arrests (or fabricated the evidence if none could be found), and finally conducted the arrests before they could even develop formal charges. One example will perfectly illustrate this sequence:

Giorgi Kalandadze – Army Chief of Staff – was arrested on November 7th, just a few days after a case in which he was implicated was opened. The arrest came after GD’s Minister of Defense failed to replace Kalandadze with his loyal figure (under the current constitution it is the prerogative of the president to appoint Army Chief of Staff). The arrest was supported only by witness testimonies and one of the witnesses later reneged on his testimony (it was the same witness as in the case with Akhalaia). The charges against Kalandadze were not brought until November 9th and even when brought, they lacked detail – he was arrested for a single incident of “verbally and physically abusing” several soldiers in 2011 but what this actually meant was not specified. Given the weak case for Kalandadze’s pre-trial detention, the court released him on bail. Immediately after this, charges were filed against Kalandadze to suspend him from office while he is a subject of investigation. The judge satisfied these demands, and in the end Kalandadze was removed from his position as the Army Chief of Staff.

Needless to say, that in a democratic country it would be inconceivable to arrest such a high-ranking official on a case that was opened just a couple of days prior and was based purely on witness testimony. Even more outrageous would be holding such a high-ranking officer in detention without formally charging him with anything for 2 days. Such things just do not happen unless the motive of the arrest is not pursuit of justice but rather politics.

b. Use of pre-trial detention

If the practice of building strong cases before charging high-ranking ex-government officials is common in democracies, the practice of using pre-trial detention is extremely uncommon. Unless there is a serious flight risk, the prosecution rarely demands pre-trial detention, and even if demanded the pre-trial detention is rarely supported by the court. For example, former Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi did not spend a single day in detention or under arrest while his trial was ongoing. Perhaps an even better example is the case of the former Illinois governor, Rod Blagojevich, which perfectly illustrates how such high-profile cases should be handled.

Rod Blagojevich was arrested by FBI on corruption charges in December of 2008. By that time the investigation which resulted in his arrest had been going on for 3 years. A month before the arrest, FBI was granted a permission to wire-tap and record Blagojevich’s conversations, and his arrest was in part based on these recordings. Blagojevich was arrested on the morning of December 9th. In the afternoon of the same day he was brought before the judge who released him on bail of $4,500 (but his passport was revoked to ensure that he doesn’t leave the country). In the end, Blagojevich didn’t spend a single day in detention, and remained the governor of Illinois until January 29th of 2009 when he was impeached from his post.

This example contrasts starkly with what has been going on in Georgia in recent months. The fact that most high-profile arrests happened only days after the investigations were opened and lacked material evidence I have already covered. After the arrested spent about 2 days behind bars (waiting to be formally charged) the prosecution invariably demanded to put them into a pre-trial detention, at times without any justification. While some were eventually released on bail (though the bail amounts were quite high for Georgia), many ended up in pre-trial detention.

It is difficult to explain by pursuit of justice alone the need to hold all these people on remand. Many of them constituted no flight risk and could not have interfered with the investigations any more than an ordinary person could. Why did the prosecution do it then? A simple display of force aimed at scaring political opponents seems like a likely answer. Thus again, in situations where one would have hoped that GD would exercise extra caution, they chose to act in ways unacceptable for democracies – all to strengthen their political position.

c. Selective application of justice

The last major point on why I am convinced GD has been engaged in politically-motivated arrests is selective application of justice. The term is quite well defined, but to be clear, by selective justice I mean cases when the law is applied differently to the opponents of the government as compared to everyone else. In the last two months, GD had demonstrated numerous such cases, but I will list 3 that I know the best:

Kakha Getsadze – the head of Zestaphoni municipality – was arrested on November 29th for a brawl at a party that took place over a year and a half ago. It seems strange that the current government dug up such an old case on a relatively minor charge only in pursuit of justice. There are probably dozens (if not more) of instances of bar fights etc. that happened much more recently and could also warrant investigation – but it seems like Getsadze’s case was brought up exactly because he was a head of Zestaphoni municipality and belonged to the opposition.

Bacho Akhalaia – the former defense and interior minister – was widely portrayed by the GD as one of the most sinister figures in UNM’s government. Akhalaia left Georgia shortly after October 2012 elections, but returned back to the country on November 5th, knowing that he would face an imminent arrest. He was arrested on November 7th, denied bail on November 9th, and has been held in pre-trial detention since then. The prosecution was adamant about keeping Akhalaia on remand, and when his trial was rescheduled from late December to late January, the Minister of Justice even said publicly that she doesn’t see anything to be concerned about if Akhalaia spends New Year in jail. I’ve already explained above why such speedy arrest and insistence on pre-trial detention are highly unusual for democracies. What I want to do here though, is to contrast Akhalaia’s case with the case of another former minister – Irakli Okruashvili (who is sympathetic to GD). Okruashvili fled Georgia in late 2007, and he was later sentenced by the UNM government to several years in prison on a number of charges. Since then he resided in France on a political asylum. Just like Akhalaia, Okruashvili recently returned to Georgia knowing that he will be facing an imminent arrest, and he was promptly arrested when his plane landed in Tbilisi. However, the prosecution has been actively pushing for Okruashvili’s release on bail. The same minister of justice that was so insistent on Akhalaia’s pre-trial detention recently said that the fact that Okruashivili returned to Georgia voluntarily knowing that he’ll be arrested was sufficient to release him on bail. She seems to have forgotten that Akhalaia also returned to Georgia voluntarily. It looks like for GD the fact that Akhalaia is from UNM while Okruashvili opposes UNM is sufficient enough to treat them differently before the law.

Tengiz Gunava – as I mentioned above Gunava was arrested on fabricated evidence, and later the people responsible for his arrest were fired by the current Interior Minister. The selective application of justice here was not so much to Gunava (in this, there was no justice at all) but to the 5 people who were fired for planting evidence. At the first glance it might be difficult to see signs of selective justice here – after all, those who planted the evidence were promptly fired. It might even appear that the current government acted prudently. However, the selective application of justice becomes apparent once we compare this to some other ongoing cases that the current government is pursuing. Specifically, on November 15th, 2012 twelve members of the former government were arrested on charges of illegal surveillance and confinement. Among them were Shota Khizanishvili – a former deputy of interior minister and Levan Kardava – a former head of Department of Constitutional Security. In my mind, planting of evidence and illegal surveillance and confinement are comparable charges (planting evidence might actually be much worse). Yet, those who broke the law under current government were simply fired, while those who allegedly broke the law under the previous government were arrested and most of them were denied bail. Clearly, the current government is much more lenient toward its own members than toward their political opponents. Such selective application of the law is simply unacceptable in a democracy.

To sum up: it is clear that under the name of “restoration of justice” the new government has engaged in prosecution of the opposition. Vast majority of the high-profile arrests they conducted over the last 2 months were politically motivated. This can be seen from the fact that instead of following practices commonly accepted in democracies, the new government has: (1) employed a very low standard of evidence in bringing charges against political opponents, (2) has excessively used pre-trial detention as the means of intimidating the opposition, and (3) has applied justice selectively based on political sentiment. If such practices continue, this will clearly be very detrimental for Georgia.

2. Pressure of pro-opposition media

After two months in power, it has become clear that the new government has decided to continue the poor treatment of opposition media so characteristic of the previous one. In fact GD is taking this practice to the next level.

It wouldn’t be an overstatement to say that in Georgia there is no independent media. There are pro-government and pro-opposition channels. This has been the case under the UNM rule and this is the case now. Starting in late 2007, the previous government did much to ensure that they control main television channels – though they have relaxed this practice somewhat in the last year. This is not to say that there was no opposition media in Georgia. Opposition channels existed and were quite popular but their reach frequently was restricted to Tbilisi (which contains over 1/3 of Georgia’s population). Also, the pro-UNM channels frequently received favorable tax treatment.

Now, the tables seem to have turned: pro-UNM channels are being pressured as GD is fighting to gain absolute control over media. There are a couple of examples I can cite:

One of the first things the new government did after they came to power was to launch a tax probe into Georgia’s Public Broadcaster (GPB). Despite being criticized severely for this action by high-ranking western officials, GD persisted with its pressure against GPB leadership. Under Georgian law, it is very difficult to fire the head of GPB – he is elected for a term of 6 years to minimize possibility of being pressured by political interests. But if the head of GPB resigns voluntarily a new head must be elected. This is exactly what happened with the previous head of GPB, Giorgi Chanturia, who resigned on December 14th, 2012. It is important to say that no charges were ever bought against Chanturia, but it is hardly a secret to anyone that he was forced out under GD’s pressure. It must be said, that GPB was perhaps the most neutral TV channel in Georgia – though it undoubtedly had a pro-UNM bend. This bend was likely to persist even after GD came to power, and it is clear that GD was unwilling to tolerate this. In fact, GD’s leader and the new Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, publicly stated that he would like his own TV channel (Channel 9) to be become the new public broadcaster of Georgia.

The second example is the arrest of the head of Rustavi 2 (a pro-UNM channel), Nika Gvaramia on December 19th, 2012 on charges not related to his current position. Now, I will not argue whether Gvaramia is innocent or guilty of the charges brought against him – this is for the court to decide. But for the reasons I described previously, the arrest was clearly politically motivated. Gvaramia was only tangentially implicated in the case under which he was arrested, he was held in detention for 2 days before being formally charged, prosecution demanded his pre-trial detention citing his high “intellectual capabilities” though the court didn’t find this sufficient and released him on bail. Given the sensitivities surrounding bringing charges against the head of an opposition TV channel, one would think that the new government would have exercised as much caution as possible, and would have tried to do everything to ensure that their actions could not be interpreted as politically motivated. They didn’t have to keep Gvaramia in detention for 2 days and didn’t have to demand his pre-trial detention on bogus pretexts. If they had done that, it would have been very difficult to think of this incident as political pressure of the opposition. But, they decided to act differently. This makes me believe that Gvaramia’s arrest had more to do with his current position as the head of Rustavi 2 rather than with the charges brought against him.

Overall, in just 2 months GD has gained control over almost all TV channels in Georgia. After they came to power most pro-UNM channels quickly changed their leadership. Those that didn’t do so voluntarily (e.g. GPB) were pressured into removing their leadership. By mid-December 2012, Rustavi 2 remained as perhaps the only pro-UNM TV channel in Georgia, and even its leadership was a target of politically-motivated arrests. If Rustavi 2 goes the way of Imedi and GPB, the monopolization of media by GD will be complete. This did not happen under UNM rule in recent years. Though they pressured the pro-opposition media consistently, there always was a channel or two that broadcasted pro-opposition points of view. But it seems like GD is prepared to go much further than UNM ever did in this area.

3. Intimidation of opposition-controlled local governments

Perhaps the worst abuse of democratic principles by GD can be seen in their fight for control over municipal governments. The issue is simple: GD won the parliamentary elections with a 55% majority – this gives them the right to form the national government, but local governments are still under UNM control. Local elections are scheduled for 2014 – so, unless something is done, GD would not be able to have absolute control over government for nearly 2 more years (and who knows what the election results will be 2 years from now). It is clear, that GD is not willing to live under such constraints. They are trying to use whatever means possible to gain control over municipal governments now – not in 2014. In this they have shown how little they care about one of the central principles of democracy – the principle that power must be transferred by electoral means. If they are unwilling to adhere to this principle on the municipal level and if they are successful in this, who’s to say that they won’t try to do the same with national elections?

Before I describe how GD has been applying pressure to the municipal governments, let’s look at its results. Within just two months after coming to power, GD was able to take control over 31 out of 69 of Georgian municipalities. Since local elections are not due for another 2 years, most of the transfer of power has happened after the heads of local governments resigned “voluntarily.” No matter what you believe about GD and UNM, but such exodus of local government officials on voluntary basis in such a short period of time is simply impossible. So, let’s look at what enacted this dramatic change.

The scenario varies from municipality to municipality but the general picture is as follows: first, pro-UNM heads of local governments are approached by GD and are asked politely to switch sides. Those who refused are frequently threatened with financial, and at times, criminal, investigations. At times investigations are even launched against close relatives of the heads of local self-governments. Giga Akhvlediani, the new deputy head of the Financial Police is frequently cited as the one who oversees the process of blackmailing heads of local administrations. If people still don’t budge, GD activists assemble rallies in front local self-governments and try to stop them from performing their daily duties. At times these rallies turn violent – the protesters storm municipal buildings, damage government property, and refuse to leave until pro-UNM administration resigns. Police is usually quite slow to react in these cases, and when they do, no charges are brought against those who broke the law. This all happens against the backdrop of public silence and private encouragement from GD leadership.

Again, not to be empty-worded I’ll list a couple concrete examples:

Kakha Getsadze – I’ve already talked about his case before. A pro-UNM head of Zestaphoni municipality, Getsadze was arrested for a brawl at a party that happened a year and a half ago. The arrest was clearly politically-motivated with the goal being Getsadze’s removal from his current post.

Martvili municipality – on November 26th, 2012 a protest rally headed by the local leader of GD was held in front of the municipal building. After a short while the protesters stormed the building, broke furniture and windows, and refused to leave until the head of the administration resigns. They remained in the building until November 29th, when they finally were evicted by the police. But no charges were pressed against those who damaged government property and the protesters continued their pickets until December 31st – practically paralyzing the functioning of the local government. This incident has been widely criticized by such NGO’s as GYLA, ISFED, and Article 42. However, GD leadership has been suspiciously silent on the matter. One can reasonably assume that these unlawful actions were held under tacit approval of GD leadership and perhaps even with their encouragement.

The two examples that I listed are by no means isolated. Pro-UNM leaders of local self-governments of Khobi  and Vani have also been arrested. Violent protests have been held in the municipalities of Tetritskaro and Tsalka, and other forms of open pressure have been applied against pro-UNM administrations of Samtredia, Marneuli, and Poti. It is not difficult to imagine that after such examples many of local pro-UNM leaders feel threatened and resign “voluntarily.” If this is the type of “democracy” GD is planning to uphold in the future, it will go beyond most “authoritarian” tendencies of UNM.

To summarize: in the short two months after coming to power, GD (1) has engaged in politically-motivated arrests and intimidation of the high-ranking members of the opposition, (2) nearly monopolized Georgia’s media and pressured the only remaining pro-UNM television channel, and (3) has used coercive powers of the state to usurp power in local self-governments.

As I mentioned above, these are only the 3 major manifestations of the pressure GD is exerting against the opposition.  There are many more. These range from cutting funding for almost any branch of government not currently under GD’s control to thinly veiled threats made by top-ranking GD officials against UNM (for example, the new prime minister publicly stated that unless UNM becomes more cooperative the prosecution of the party will continue). Moreover, they have shown almost complete disregard to the opinions of the western leaders that have tried to point out their mistakes. Thus, it is clear to me beyond any doubt that if such behavior continues this will deal severe, perhaps irreparable, blow to the development of Georgia.

Part 2: On United National Movement and Georgian Dream

UNM’s Mistakes

This is the second note in the series on UNM and GD. In my previous note I tried to demonstrate the tremendous contribution of UNM to Georgia’s development over the last 9 years. To me, this contribution is indisputable, and the transformation enacted by it is among the most dramatic improvements in Georgia’s history.

A natural question is then, how did the party that did so much good for Georgia managed to acquire such a negative status with a large segment of the population, and in the end lost elections to a force of a very questionable nature? Well, the simple answer is that they made quite a few mistakes as well.

Here, I will not go into listing all the mistakes that UNM made over the last 9 years. Many of the mistakes were fairly minor, and I would expect any political force that tries to enact dramatic changes in a society to make some mistakes of a similar kind. There were other mistakes which, while serious in my opinion, are in no way related to why UNM lost the elections. For example, I consider the following to be some of their more serious mistakes:

  1. They left local self-governments impotent and utterly dependent on the central government
  2. They did not use their chance to develop a truly lasting constitution
  3. They converted Georgia into a parliamentary republic – which, I think, was a huge mistake
  4. They did not use the unique chance they had to get rid of VAT and corporate profit taxes
  5. They were too slow in exiting CIS and calling the things as they were vis-à-vis Russia

As I mentioned above, none of these were the reasons for why UNM lost popularity among a significant portion of the population. Those who voted against UNM did so for a variety of reasons but most frequently I could hear the following:

  1. Corruption (or more frequently “Elite Corruption” as even UNM's opponents agreed that regular corruption was reduced significantly) – this meant that UNM officials, or their friends/relatives, enriched themselves through illegal means. While I already said in my previous note that UNM failed to curb favoritism to an adequate level, I’ve also argued that the reduction in corruption has been tremendous (and bordering on miraculous). I will argue in my next note that the accusation of “elite corruption” was greatly exaggerated
  2. Violation of property rights – this is directly related to “elite corruption” and more concrete accusations here were that UNM officials illegally seized businesses and property, racketeered businessmen, bankrupted businesses through illegally imposed fines, and monopolize entire industries. I do agree that UNM’s spotty record in protecting property rights was one of their biggest mistakes – I think it should have been their top priority to ensure protection of property rights beyond any criticism. But again, I think the accusations were greatly exaggerated and frequently misplaced, and I will present my arguments in the next note
  3. Violation of human rights – the accusations here ranged from illegal imprisonments and inhumane treatment of prisoners etc. to state sponsored murders. Again, I think most of these accusations have been greatly exaggerated and some were entirely misplaced. In terms of human right violations Georgia is no worse than an average Eastern European country
  4. Reduction of media freedom – UNM was in fact trying to control mass media, and I would say that to a large extent this accusation is valid. However, it is important to note that there were always opposition TV channels in Georgia which were quite popular, and UNM actually improved significantly in this area in the year leading up to the elections
  5. Absence of independent judiciary – in my opinion, this is another valid accusation. During their time in power, UNM failed to create a judiciary system that would be beyond reproach. Out of state institutions, judiciary was perhaps the least trusted by the population – and this, in my opinion, is one of their biggest mistakes of UNM

To summarize: I do think there were some very valid accusations against UNM which had led to the loss of their popularity, however, in many cases these accusations were exaggerated beyond any reason. In many areas UNM did the best they could (or in fact, the best anyone could) – and they don’t deserve such a harsh criticism. I must say though, that nothing is without its cause and even exaggerations have reasons to exist. In many ways, the accusations I listed above are surface manifestations of more deeply running issues. To me, there were 3 strategic mistakes UNM made when they were in power. If these were handled differently many of the more “surface” mistakes could have been avoided. So, let’s look at these strategic mistakes one by one:

1. Significant government involvement into the economy

Under UNM, the government undertook a myriad of projects aimed at reviving Georgia’s economy. These included building roads, promoting entire industries (e.g. tourism), “beautifying” cities (or even building new ones). While government investment into infrastructure is necessary, UNM significantly overreached in this area. In the recent years, the government expenditures in Georgia comprised about 40% of GDP – a level more common for developed countries. Government spearheaded many of the projects and was directly involved in such diverse things as building hotels or popularizing new agricultural techniques. While this led to many positive results (I really like how the new Batumi looks) – nothing is without its price. In this case, I believe, that the positives gained by the government involvement were significantly outweighed by the negatives.

When the government decides to get involved into the economy two things happen: (1) the number of touch points between the government and private citizens increases, and (2) the government needs money to finance its projects. Both of these create very negative effects in the society. Specifically:

1. As the number of touch points between the government and private citizens increases, additional opportunities for corruption are created. This is an especially big problem in Georgia where favoritisms is fairly widespread. Any project that the government undertakes is susceptible to favoritism, and the more projects there are the more likely it is that some of them will be undertaken under less than kosher conditions. For example, if the government is involved in a construction of a hotel, opportunities for favoritism abound – the choice of the land plot, the choice of the construction company, the choice of the investor – all of these could be done in such a way as to favor someone who has government ties. On the other hand, if the government has nothing (or very little) to do with the construction of the hotel, no favoritism is possible. What’s worse, the favoritism does not actually need to take place – whenever there is government involvement, there is always a suspicion that someone benefited wrongfully – regardless of whether this was the case or not. It is not surprising then, that UNM lost the elections in areas where they actually undertook a lot of projects (e.g. Batumi), and won in areas where their involvement into the economy was much less limited (e.g. Samegrelo).

2. Any increase in government involvement requires additional funds. This in turn means higher taxes, and nobody likes higher taxes. If the government did not get involved into as many projects as it did, taxes could have been made significantly lower which would have benefitted the business environment. Alternatively, increased number of projects means that some projects of significant economic importance get delayed. For example, as much as I like the look of new Batumi, I think that if the resources spent on the development of Batumi were diverted to building the Tbilisi-Batumi autobahn and it would have been completed by now – it would have been better.

I do not want to say that government should completely abstain from infrastructure investment. Building roads, bridges, airports etc. is something that Georgia desperately needs given the long period of neglect. But it should have been understood that each new project the government engages in has very real negative consequences – it means higher taxes and creates opportunities for corruption. Thus, only absolutely necessary projects should warrant government involvement. Building a Tbilisi-Batumi autobahn is one such project, moving parliament to Kutaisi is another (and I wish both of these were completed at least a couple of years ago). However, building hotels or improving agricultural techniques should be left to private investors. “Beautification” of cities should be left to empowered local governments, which have the power of taxation to finance these projects if the local population looks favorably on them. I am confident, that if the projects UNM government undertook over the last 9 years were analyzed from this perspective, many of them would have been canceled. At the very least, it would have helped with curtailing favoritism.

2. Using “Singaporean” methods in a semi-democracy

Georgians are not very law-abiding citizens. The long Soviet (and post-soviet) period when laws were generally considered to be unfair, when bribery was commonplace, and breaking the law was a way to assert one’s individuality have left their mark on Georgian mentality. It manifests itself in many ways: from disorganized automotive traffic where hardly anyone follows traffic laws to endemic evasion of taxes. When I was in Georgia in 2008 I heard from multiple businessmen that it was a common practice to keep 3 sets of financial books – one for the government, one for the bank, and one for yourself.

What UNM tried to do over the last 9 years was to change this by applying “Singaporean” methods – that is, by enacting very strict punishments for breaking the law. These methods worked in Singapore which was much less democratic when these measures were enacted than Georgia is now. The difference is that in Singapore the government was much less dependent on popular opinion than is the Georgian government – so, it was able to weather the period of time when such measures led to the loss of popular support. This was not the case for the UNM government.

The thing is that any fine is upsetting to people – even if you know that you’ve broken the law (and especially so if you feel that the law is unfair). When we get traffic tickets for speeding, for the most part, we still feel that we’ve done nothing wrong and we are genuinely upset at the police. Given how endemic law evasion was in Georgia, once UNM started to implement very strict policies, a lot of people got slammed with fines which, while they were lawful, seemed very unfair. Just last year, I had a conversation with an importer of clothing from Turkey. He was fined almost $10K for underreporting the number of socks on his customs declaration: he was supposed to import 10,000 socks, but the shipment contained something like 10,200 (the actual discrepancy could have been larger, but that’s what I was told). Needless to say that he was very upset for paying this fine. In his words, “the government lives by collecting fines.” In another example, a distant relative of mine was fined for evading taxes on his business (the charge was fair). For some reason, he failed to pay the fine for over 6 months by which time he discovered that the fine, due to the late fees, had almost tripled (again, the actual numbers could have been different, but that’s what I was told). He was ready to pay the original fine, but the government insisted that he pay the new amount – so, he was forced to close his business.

The two examples above were lawful but still upsetting. I am sure the cases when the legality of fines was much less clear (and I am sure these happened a lot) were simply enraging. Needless to say that this turned a lot of people against UNM and contributed to the accusations of corruption. A person who is fined legally but who believes that the fine is unfair usually does not blame the law but rather blames those who implemented the law (when we get a speeding ticket we hardly say that it is the speed limit that is unfair, but rather we are upset with a police officer who caught us).  Similarly, people who had to close down their business because of government fines frequently explained this as corruption, even if the fine was true to the letter of the law. The fact that the fines were paid into the government treasury did not make them feel any better.

Could UNM have done anything differently? – I believe so. For one, they could have made the fines less draconian. Yes, it would have taken more time to transform Georgians into law-abiding citizens, but it would have been much less stressful for the people, and in the end beneficial for UNM. More importantly, they could have done more to change the incentives for people to break the law. For example, eliminating VAT and corporate profit taxes removes the incentive for people to keep double or triple financial books. Changes like this could have eliminated a lot of bad blood between the government and private citizens.

3. Monopolizing power

As I mentioned above, UNM had a near monopoly on power in Georgia for almost 9 years. In the beginning this monopolization was both reflective of popular support (as I mentioned before, during presidential elections in 2004 Saakashvili received 97% of popular vote) and necessary. Necessary because many of the reforms that UNM undertook would have been simply impossible had the power been shared with other political forces. However, more recently this monopolization was less and less justified. First, UNM’s popular support declined over time, yet its hold on power remained undiluted –other political forces practically did not participate in any of the governing processes. Second, the need to wield uncontested power to conduct fundamental reforms has declined as well. In fact, UNM undertook very few (if any) such reforms in the recent years.

Since 2009 my position was that one of the biggest problems of Georgia was lack of sensible opposition. To be honest, it is difficult for me to say what UNM could have done to address this. But the fact is simple: in Georgian politics there was UNM, those who hated UNM almost on a personal level, but nothing in-between. Perhaps the environment created by UNM was such that it prevented any political force that was in moderate opposition to the party from gaining steam – to be against UNM you really had to hate their guts. Perhaps the reasons lie elsewhere. But it is the inability to cultivate a sensible opposition and include it into the government processes that I consider one of UNM’s greatest strategic failings.

It is the lack of sensible opposition that led to the stigmatization of UNM despite their unprecedented achievements and in the end brought to power a political force that hates UNM to a point of irrationality. First, since UNM was the only force in power and did not share this power with any other political force it got all the blame for the mistakes made by the government. Whether the failure was in the executive, the legislative, the judicial branch, on local or national level – it was UNM’s failure. It doesn’t matter that in many cases mistakes were unavoidable, and it is likely that most other political forces would have done no better (and quite possibly much worse) – the mistakes stuck to UNM. And 9 years of mistakes with no one to share them with can stigmatize any political force in any country. So, after a while, many people simply got tired of UNM. Perhaps a simple example would illustrate my point: if UNM had ceded the control of the penitentiary system to another political force, at the very least, it would have absolved itself of the mistakes that could have happened there. In the best case, it would have led to a better and more transparent penitentiary system in which the atrocities that cost UNM the elections could not have happened.

Second, the absence of a sensible opposition ensured that when UNM lost power it lost it to a force that had nearly animalistic hatred for the party. For the reasons described above, UNM could not have held the power forever. People tend to remember mistakes but take achievements as given – this is why in electoral democracies political parties periodically replace each other. As long as they maintained electoral mechanisms of power transfer, UNM was bound to lose sooner or later and, unfortunately, without sensible opposition, this transfer of power turned out to be very damaging for the country.

The monopolization of power was damaging to UNM itself. It is extremely difficult (if not impossible) for any political force to exercise self-restraint. As such, any political party which has no opposition will sooner or later slide into complacency and authoritarianism – and UNM is no exception. While they managed to check their authoritarian tendencies and in the end conducted fairly democratic elections and peacefully gave up power, same cannot be said about complacency. It is not a secret that the party had degraded significantly in the recent years and became somewhat disconnected from the population. Many of those who joined the party did so only because this was the most straightforward way to make a career in government – not because they were loyal to UNM or their ideals (which also became quite diluted recently). The decay was such that it seems the party has to be re-built almost anew since their loss in elections.

To sum up: I believe at the core of UNM’s loss of popularity lie 3 strategic mistakes: (1) they involved the government in too many projects which should have been left to the private businesses (or in some cases to empowered local governments) – this lead to higher real and perceived corruption; (2) they took law enforcement (especially for economic crimes) to an unjustifiably harsh levels – many of the businessmen who were fined for minor violations should have been spared such fate; and (3) they failed to create conditions to cultivate a moderate opposition and did not include any other political forces into the government – thus, they had no one to check their behavior or to share their mistakes with. If they had done things differently in these 3 areas, it is quite likely that they would have still been in power, or if they lost power, it would have been a positive development for Georgia. As the things stand now, it is very difficult to be optimistic about Georgia’s near future, and it will take much work to ensure that all the positive changes UNM was able to enact over the last 9 years are not reversed.

Part 1: On United National Movement and Georgian Dream

I had been wanting to write this note for a while – probably since mid-December. But I wasn’t able to dedicate sufficient time to it on the one hand, and on the other, it actually took me longer than I expected to systematize my thinking on the subject. The two points I will try to address in this note are:

  1. Over the last 9 years, United National Movement (UNM) has been a very positive force in the development of Georgia. They were far not perfect and they failed in many important areas, but overall, their contribution to the development of the country has been enormous
  2. Georgian Dream Coalition (GD), which took control over the government about two months ago, is leading Georgia in the wrong direction. If left unchecked, they will undermine the positive developments of the last 9 years and will risk throwing the country back into the chaos of the 90’s

I think it is important to address these two points because: first, over the last several years (and more so recently) UNM has been vilified to the point where many Georgians become irrational when discussing anything related to the party or its leaders. A large segment of Georgian population actually believes that UNM did more bad for Georgia than good, and that the party should have no future in Georgia’s politics. I strongly disagree with this point, and I think elimination of UNM as a political force will deal a severe blow to the democratic development of Georgia.

Second, the recent victory of GD resulted in euphoria in a large segment of Georgia’s population. This euphoria seems to have left many people blind to the events that started to unfold in the country. Clear violations of democratic principles by the new government are sometimes ignored, and at times are even justified on the grounds that “UNM did it too.” I fear that by the time this euphoria recedes and people become more critical of the new government, the damage might be irreparable.

There is a lot that I want to say on the subject, and the note will end up being quite lengthy. So, instead of posting a single 20 page note, I will break it up into a sequence of 3 separate notes. The first note will address main achievements of UNM, for which, I believe, they deserve a permanent place in Georgia’s “hall of fame." In the second note, I will try to analyze the mistakes that they made and the reasons for their defeat in the recent elections. In the last note, I will make an argument against GD and explain why what is happening in Georgia now is detrimental for country’s development. So, let’s begin:

UNM’s Contribution to Georgia’s Development

I won’t go into much detail on what Georgia was before the Rose Revolution brought UNM to power in 2003. In many ways it was a failed state where an impotent and corrupt government was not able to guarantee basic freedoms and safeties to its citizens. Since then much has changed in Georgia. Any attempt on my part to capture in this note all the aspects of the transformation that took place over the last 9 years would be futile – a book would be needed to describe them (and a few have already been written). So, I would like to focus on the 3 things which, in my opinion, have been the most important achievements of UNM:

1. Eradicating Crime

In my opinion, out of the ills that can fall onto a society an unrestricted reign of organized crime is one of the worst. The power that organized crime (the so-called “thieves-in-law”) gained in Georgia after the collapse of the USSR was unprecedented, perhaps only rivaled by Italian mafia or Colombian cartels. Not only did the thieves-in-law control businesses, ran prisons, and used police as their personal security force, but they also made it “cool” to belong to the criminal world. The “crime culture” permeated many levels of Georgian society with many young boys dreaming of becoming thieves-in-law when they grow up, and young girls dreaming of marrying one. Those initiated into the criminal organizations had real power, were often respected by their peers, and many looked up to them and tried to imitate their lifestyle of crime and drug use (which became endemic in Georgia).

On the less “organized” end of the criminal spectrum things were no better. Break-ins, armed robberies, kidnappings, thefts etc. were pervasive. Those venturing out to walk alone at night through the unlit streets of Tbilisi did so at considerable risk. Even as late as 2007 leaving a car on the street overnight was a risky endeavor. I remember visiting Georgia in March of 2007 and virtually everyone I knew used secure parking lots to park their cars overnight. One time my cousin forgot to re-park her car onto a secure parking lot and, surely enough, the car was broken into and the stereo was stolen.

This situation was dramatically changed in the short 9 years of UNM rule. Thieves-in-law no longer rule Georgia – they are either in prisons or have fled the country. Crime levels have fallen dramatically. The last few times I visited Georgia, leaving a car on the street unlocked overnight (which I did on a couple of occasions) was quite safe. As a result the secure parking lots have mostly gone out of business. People in general feel much safer, and it would not be an overstatement to say that as far as crime is concerned, Georgia is one of the safest countries in the world. In fact, based on the survey conducted by Gallup in 2011, more Georgians answered positively to the question “Do you feel safe walking alone at night?” than did people in any other country (91% in Georgia vs. 75% in the U.S. or 40% in Russia, for comparison). What’s more important, the “romantic” image of being a criminal has been largely dispelled in Georgia: criminals are no longer feared, respected, or looked up to – and this to me is just short of a miracle.

How was this miracle achieved? I must say that the methods were not always beyond reproach and the government quite frequently did not follow the letter of the law. I am sure there were cases when known criminals were arrested on false pretexts, and I am sure once arrested many of them were treated less than civilly. I am also sure there were mistakes and innocent people suffered, and it’s highly likely that some government officials used this war on crime to advance their personal agendas. What’s more, anxious to maintain its popularity, the government often tried to cover-up its mistakes. Lastly, the government enacted rather harsh penalties even for minor crimes, and this “zero-tolerance” policy toward crime resulted in a sharp increase in Georgia’s prison population – Georgia became one of the leaders in terms inmates per capita (through still trailing behind such countries as the U.S. or Russia).

Now, some might say that these methods were unacceptable. That it is better to let 10 criminals go free than to punish one innocent person. To that I would say that this is a very naïve way of looking at things, for when we are dealing with organized and pervasive crime, the 10 criminals who escape punishment will ruin the lives of hundreds of innocent people. I wish mistakes didn’t happen and that innocent people didn’t have to suffer, I wish that defeating pervasive crime didn’t require putting a large number of petty criminals behind bars and turning prisons into institutions which criminals feared to end up in – but unfortunately, such is not the case. We can look back and dwell on every mistake UNM has made in their war on crime and say that they should have done a better job, but, in my opinion, given the dysfunctional institutions that they inherited from the previous government and understanding what they were up against, they performed a miracle. With a possible exception of the U.S., I am not aware of any country where organized crime has been beaten back as decisively and the safety of ordinary citizens improved as dramatically in as short a period of time and with as little “collateral damage” as in Georgia during UNM rule.

2. Reigning in Corruption

Just as crime permeated many levels of Georgian society before UNM came to power, so did corruption. Georgia was perhaps the most corrupt republic of the former Soviet Union during its terminal years, and things only got worse after the USSR fell apart. The corruption in traffic police was legendary – motorists were frequently stopped for the sole purpose of extracting bribes from them in the most shameless manner – but corruption in many other government institutions did not fall far behind. To say that paying bribes for official documents (e.g. a passport or a driver’s license) was commonplace would be a gross understatement. Same applied to universities, hospitals etc. – it was not only considered normal that one could pay off a dean of a university to make sure his child gets admitted, or would bribe a hospital administrator to make sure he gets decent treatment, or would pay a finance inspector to evade taxes – but in many cases such behavior was expected. The bribery was so engrained into everyday life of Georgian society that I frequently heard that it is an inseparable part of Georgian culture.

While UNM was able to dramatically reduce corruption in Georgia, their success in this area was not as uniform as in combating crime. But before I get to where they succeeded and where they failed, I would like to touch upon the different types of corruption that can exist in a society.

The way I think about it is that there are two different types of corruption: bribery and favoritism. Bribery is when a person pays off a public servant to get something in return. The worst form of bribery is when people are forced to pay for the services they should be getting anyway. For example, you want to register property but a myriad of government agencies makes you jump through endless hoops, come up with all kinds of documents etc. until you pay them off – and as soon as you do, the property gets registered immediately. A slightly more benign form of bribery is when people pay off public servants to get some special treatment. For example, you know that registering property takes 6 months, but you can pay a small bribe to a public servant and it will happen in 1 month. Even though I called this form of bribery “slightly more benign” it frequently degenerates into the first form – once public servants get into a habit of accepting bribes, they quickly regress into trying to extort bribes for things they are supposed to do anyway.

The second type of corruption is favoritism – this is when people use their personal relationships or connections to gain favorable treatment from the government. Favoritism can have many incarnations. For example, government contracts can go to relatives or friends of people within the government, or those with government ties can get government-backed loans with low interest rates, or competitors of the companies with government ties may get unfavorable treatment from the financial inspectors etc. The last example is probably the worst, not only do companies with government ties get favorable treatment, but the rights of their competitors get violated.

Now, UNM’s success in fighting these two different types of corruption was very different. Bribery was almost entirely eradicated. In fact, bribery levels in Georgia are approaching those in Western European countries which is confirmed by several international studies. Paying off police now is unimaginable. Same goes for tax inspectors, customs officials, and most other public servants. In the area of bribery UNM was able to achieve similarly astonishing result as they did in eradication of crime – which again, taking into account what they had to deal with is practically a miracle.

Not so rosy was the situation with favoritism which is still a real problem in Georgia. It is undeniable that having government connections in Georgia is extremely beneficial for business (though this is true in most other countries in the world). This is especially true for larger enterprises and certain industries (e.g. television). There are all kinds of favoritism in Georgia: companies with the connection to the government are more likely to win government contracts, get licenses on certain types of business activity, get favorable financing from government funds etc. Members of the government or their friends/relatives sometimes used to get a more lenient treatment from the law (as opposed to other citizens). There are even rumors of the government using its power to crush competitors of companies with government ties.

While this situation is nothing to brag about, I believe that in many ways the severity of favoritism in Georgia is exaggerated.

First, Georgia is a small country and there are almost certainly less than 6 degrees of separation between people. As such, a person through his friends and relatives is naturally connected to a fairly large segment of the population. When people see that a minister’s childhood friend or a brother-in-law are successful businessman they frequently assume that they must have used their government connections to get there. While this is certainly true in some cases, there are also undoubtedly those who did not rely on the government to realize themselves. Similarly, if a person with some relation to the government wins a government contract, it very well might be that his firm was best suited for the job, but the public frequently assumes that the contract was won solely because of government connections. Naturally, such assumptions lead to an exaggerated perception of favoritism.

Second, despite numerous rumors circulated in Georgia that most of the businesses were directly or indirectly controlled by UNM government, and that the government oppressed a large majority of businessmen over the last 9 years, these claims do not live up to the scrutiny. Even in sectors which the government considered to be its strategic interest (such as television) there were companies which, beyond any doubt, were not controlled by the government (e.g. Maestro, Channel 9). Of course, for the television stations that were in the opposition to the government, life was much more complicated than for those that were pro-government (for example, pro-government stations got very favorable tax treatment) – but they existed and had fairly large audiences. Similarly, in many other industries with high government involvement (e.g. telecom, energy), there existed successful companies with no or little ties to the government. For example, one of Georgia’s leading mobile network operators is owned by the son-in-law of the former president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze – nobody would say that he was somehow favorably treated under the UNM government.

If UNM allowed real competition to exist in sectors of the economy which it considered vital for its survival (e.g. television) or which were extremely profitable (e.g. telecom, energy), it is reasonable to assume that the government involvement in other sectors was minimal. In fact, in my subsequent notes I will make an argument that less than 1% of Georgia’s businessmen were “oppressed” under UNM rules (this rough estimate is possible based on some of the data recently released by the new government), and that perception of “oppression” resulted more from the harsh measures UNM instituted to raise government revenue and reduce “shadow” economy, than from any actual acts of oppression and favoritism.

This brings me to my next point: because favoritism is difficult to measure, while we can say that it is a real problem in Georgia, it is difficult to compare it to what is happening in other countries. Favoritism in general is much more difficult to get rid of than bribery. Even in developed countries there is plenty of it (Solyndra, anyone?). And I have no basis to say that favoritism in Georgia is more widespread than it is, for example, in Turkey, Bulgaria, or Romania. Moreover, it is not easy to conclusively define the trend of how favoritism has changed in Georgia over time. It seems to be fairly obvious that favoritism in Georgia now is much less widespread than it was before 2003. At the same time, it seems like it has increased in the last couple of years. To make sure I am understood correctly: I do think that favoritism is a real problem in Georgia. In my opinion, UNM has failed to curtail it to a tolerable level, and this is one of their biggest mistakes. But saying that favoritism is endemic or that it is significantly higher in Georgia than it is in many Eastern European countries is simply not true.

In short, over the last 9 years, UNM was able to achieve a near-miracle in reigning in corruption. They reduced bribery in the country to nearly Western European levels, and if you put that together with some, even if inadequate, reduction in favoritism, Georgia now is probably no more corrupt that many Eastern European countries. This is confirmed by numerous international studies the latest of which was Transparency International’s report which ranked Georgia 51st out of 174 countries – ahead of such European countries as Czech Republic, Turkey, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Given where the things were 9 years ago, when Georgia was one of the most corrupt countries in the world (in 2003, Georgia was 124th out of 133), this achievement is astonishing, and UNM deserves credit for it.

3. Functioning Elections

No matter how you look at it, under UNM government functional electoral mechanisms of changing power were developed in Georgia, and I consider this to be one of their biggest contributions to the development of the country. Some might argue that the electoral institutions developed in Georgia despite, not because of UNM – and in many ways this would be a valid point. They indeed pressured opposition, changed laws to make their victories in elections more likely, used administrative resources to improve their chances etc. But I would say it is not what they did but rather what they didn’t do that is important in this case.

Few, if any, political forces voluntarily give up their power. Even the most democratic ones try to use whatever means possible to stay in power. I can cite a few examples: Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States, tried to change electoral districts of New York to ensure victory of Federalists (his party) in presidential elections. Or, Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence and another founding father of the U.S., tried to covertly sabotage president’s Adams’ negotiations with France to score political points against Federalists. Very frequently, politicians, once in power, do exactly the things that they criticize their opponents for. I can see it all too well in the U.S. and I am sure it is happening in most other countries as well. Some would say that this is because politicians are un-principled, and that politics is a dirty business. While this is certainly true, I believe that in many cases politics polarizes people so much that they think that if their opponents come to power it will be the end of the world. Hamilton, for example, honestly believed that if Jefferson were to come to power it would be the end of the U.S. and this is why he was willing to advocate some very dishonest measures against him. Same goes for Jefferson, who honestly believed that Hamilton with his Federalist party was leading the U.S. into monarchy.

Now, UNM had come to power on an unprecedented wave of popular support. In 2004 elections Saakashvili got 97% of the vote. In the parliament UNM had a constitutional majority for the entire 9 years of their rule. So, in many ways, their power was nearly absolute. Leaders of UNM also honestly believed that if their opponents came to power it would be the end of Georgia (whether this is the right thing to believe I will leave outside of the scope of this note). So, when you combine near-absolute power with the belief that your opponents will destroy your country, it is really surprising to me that UNM was able to exercise so much self-restraint.

So, let’s consider some of the things that they didn’t do:

First, they didn’t crush the opposition as is the typical practice in most post-soviet countries. To be sure, UNM didn’t make it easy for the opposition, but the pressure was fairly mild. Opposition leaders were not jailed, public protests were mostly not interfered with (for example, in 2009 opposition pretty much paralyzed Tbilisi with protests for 2 months without much interference from the government), and opposition media existed and was quite vibrant (Maestro, Channel 9 were two very popular opposition channels, and UNM even passed the “must –carry” laws before the election extending access to these channels to all cable subscribers in the country). Despite, being called “authoritarian” by the opposition, UNM’s rule tolerated a very vocal opposition which constantly challenged the government though elections, media, and public protest.

Second, they did not rig the elections. It is widely accepted that October 2012 elections were exemplary. In fact, UNM did everything possible to ensure that they cannot be accused of falsifying the election results. The voter lists were coordinated with the opposition, international observers were invited to participate in the monitoring of elections, and vote counting was very transparent and in the vast majority of cases beyond reproach.

Lastly, they did not cling to power after losing the elections. When it became clear that they lost the elections, they did not try to steer up violence, create instability, and try to cancel the election results. Instead, they did everything possible to ensure peaceful transfer of power to their direct opponents, and even gave up some of the positions that they didn’t have to according to the constitution.

The last 2 points are especially telling when you contrast them with what happened in 2003. Then, an impotent government with significantly less popular support than UNM in 2012 tried to rig the elections, and when their falsifications were exposed, kept clinging to power. A revolution was needed to enact the transfer of power (thankfully, it was a peaceful one). In October of 2012, UNM had 40% of popular support and very powerful state institutions at its disposal. But unlike Shevardnadze, for one reason or another, they decided not to employ them to remain in power.

In short, UNM maintained an environment where a vocal opposition could exist, did not falsify the elections, and when they lost, relinquished the power peacefully. Given Georgia’s recent history and that UNM had near-monopoly on power for the last 9 years, it is a near-miracle that things unfolded the way that they did.

Now, to summarize my very long 3 points on UNM’s main achievements: in a very short period of time they were able: (1) to virtually eradicate crime brining it down to Western European levels, (2) to significantly curtail corruption (and especially bribery) bringing it down to the Eastern European levels, and (3) to build a functioning mechanism of peacefully transferring power by the means of elections.

The importance of these achievements cannot be underestimated. Even if they had done nothing else, they would deserve a permanent honorable place in the line of those who pushed Georgian state forward. But in fact they had many more accomplishments from stimulating rapid expansion of the economy to virtually eliminating Russia’s influence in Georgia. Georgia now is indeed a very different place, almost world apart, from the failed state it was just 9 years ago – and UNM deserves a lion’s share of credit for this transformation.